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ABSTRACT: The article is on the system of 
the safety network of the financial sector in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH) and potential 
causes  of  possible  financial  instability. 
The  network  of  protection  of  financial 
institutions  in  BH  is  to  a  certain  extent 
incomplete but a high level of regulatory 
and supervisory activities has been present 
so far, which effects the expressed stability 
of  financial  institutions.  Potential  risks 
and  the  vulnerability  of  the  financial 
system arise from a range of features which 
are  characteristic  of  the  local  financial 
institutions, their activities, the condition 
of  the  BH  economy,  and  macroeconomic 
stability  and  flows  of  goods  and  capital 
between the country and foreign countries. 
The sector of financial institutions has been 
privatized and it is in foreign ownership. 
Foreign exposure of domestic economy and 
financial markets is limited to only a small 
number of countries (Austria, Germany). 
There  are  pressures  in  respect  of  the 
increased rates of return on bank capital 
and there is a very high dynamic of credit 
growth.  Possible  unfavourable  scenarios 
could bring about problems in the banking 
sector,  which  is  shown  by  stress  tests. 
The  deterioration  of  the  macroeconomic 
imbalance could also be a significant cause 
of serious problems in the local financial 
sector. There are no certain indicators that 
this could happen in the near future and 
influence  the  appearance  of  a  financial 
crisis; however, such a situation cannot be 
ruled out.
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Introduction
The banking system in BH, as in other countries in the region, has been privatized 
and restructured. Foreign banks, to a greater or lesser degree, are the dominant 
bank owners in the countries of former Yugoslavia and Central and Eastern 
Europe, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The financial sector in these countries 
has been expanding intensively. This particularly applies to the sector of lending 
to citizens and companies. In BH, banking is the most propulsive sector. The 
confidence of the public is returning. Savings and credits are growing. However, 
the dynamic of economic growth is not unproblematic. There is the question of 
banking safety, and whether there is a danger of destabilization in the banking 
system in BH’s weak and unstable economy. Therefore the questions we will 
consider are whether there is a crisis threatening, and how big the risk of the crisis 
appearing is? Will there be a crisis of bank liquidity and/or solvency? What could 
prevent a potential crisis? What guarantees the safety of the banking system and 
depositors? Will the foreign exchange rate remain stable in the future and will the 
local currency remain convertible? These are the questions that those responsible 
for the country’s economic policy, any local holder of savings (or financial capital) 
and foreign investors inevitably face. This is of equal concern to the investor with 
minimal savings whose foremost care is the safety of his deposit and to large 
local or foreign investors. Unfortunately, no one can provide a precise and clear 
answer to this question which would relieve investors of their concerns. All we 
can do is consider the current situation in the banking system and the degree of 
efficiency of complex mechanisms of protection that make for financial discipline 
and  the  undisturbed  functioning  of  the  financial  system.  Such  mechanisms 
should prevent the financial system from being “surprised” by a strong shock, 
either internal or external, which could undermine it or ultimately bring about 
its complete collapse, with serious consequences for the economy and people’s 
living standards.
1. Safety network
Highly industrialized and developed countries usually succeed in safeguarding 
their financial systems. Of course financial crises take place, as they are integral 
to the market economy. Minor shocks arising from the poor operation of big 
banks are solved by the state, i.e. its agencies, which through routine or innovative 
mechanisms save the bank or financial institution that is in trouble. Saving a bank 
by bringing about its financial recovery through restructuring should provide 
for the safety of investors and thereby also ensure the trust of the public in the 200
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financial system. Before the bank finds itself in difficulties that demand financial 
rehabilitation it is the subject of multiple supervision by appropriate agencies 
and state bodies, which should signal the appearance of potential difficulties in 
the bank’s operations. This leads to the implementation of appropriate measures 
aimed at treating and removing operational difficulties.
The safety network is a concept denoting different systems for the protection of 
the financial sector from the appearance and expansion of various disturbances 
and possible panic caused by them, which can undermine the complete system, 
with possible disastrous consequences. The financial system of developed market 
economies is covered by the safety network system at three levels. The first level 
of the safety network is the primary role of the central bank, which, through 
its participation in the payment system, carries out its supervision and control 
and ensures its undisturbed functioning. The central bank supervises banks’ 
operations,  perceives  difficulties  and  problems  and,  generally,  effects  their 
removal.. The second level of protection is related to the function of the central 
bank as “lender of last resort”. When a bank exhausts all the possibilities for 
providing the missing liquid funds (borrowing from other banks or obtaining 
the  funds  in  the  money  market),  the  central  bank  remains  the  last  resort, 
extending credit to the commercial bank in order to maintain liquidity. In this 
way although the bank is not liquid it is solvent. The third level of protection is 
outside the central bank. It is the deposit insurance system which is activated 
when the bank becomes permanently illiquid, i.e. insolvent. Deposit insurance 
only protects small depositors, whose deposits are returned to them if the bank is 
closed down. As deposit insurance has shown weaknesses in practice, the safety 
network mainly relies on the first two levels of protection.
Everywhere in the world banking is regulated. One of the reasons is the need to 
protect depositors from bad or unconscientious bank operations, thus ensuring 
the trust of the public in the banking sector. The other reason is the fact that 
a high degree of risk is inherent to banking. Why do banks undertake risky 
investments? The essential answer to this question, according to Stiglitz and 
Greenwald (2003, p. 209) is the fact that the costs of banks in case of a failure 
are lower than the costs of society reflected through the macroeconomic costs 
and the costs of saving banks. Regulators and banks appear in the typical roles 
of principals and agents where the regulators in the role of the principal try to 
control and affect the behaviour of banks as agents, with the intention of making 
banks act more in accordance with social objectives.SAFETY NETWORK SYSTEM IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
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The task of regulation and supervision is to reduce the system risk and other 
risks arising from asymmetric information. Such asymmetry is present not only 
in the relation bank – the credit user, but also in the regulator – bank relation. 
Regulation and supervision are useful for institutions because of system features 
in the financial sector where the interest of each individual institution is that 
other  institutions  should  be  financially  healthy.  The  institutions  themselves 
benefit from supervision even though higher operative costs are imposed on them 
and the possibility of their own selection of portfolio is decreased. For example 
one restriction is the attempt of regulation to discourage lending in some cases, 
such as lending to insiders (related parties), even if good credits are in question. 
In this way, good credits are actually eliminated, which, due to the asymmetry of 
information, cannot be taken over by other banks.
Supervision should be independent, yet there is a lot of evidence that due to the 
interests of controlled institutions there can be a strong pressure to influence 
supervision and regulation, through strengthening or loosening of standards. 
More rigid standards might better suit some institutions which do not want to 
be jeopardized by “more relaxed” institutions, while weaker standards might 
better suit others. Research has shown that supervision and regulation systems 
differ according to the country and they are closely related to the strength or 
weaknesses of the financial system. The findings of some studies stress that 
problems arise mainly from the weaknesses of the financial system, rather than 
from supervision (Hardy C.D. 2006 p.21).
At the bank level, the concerns and decisions in respect of taking a certain degree 
of risk and undertaking measures for protection against risk fall primarily within 
the responsibility of the bank management. The owners are interested in the 
safe operation of the bank as losses are a burden on the bank’s profitability, and 
eventually, they are at the expense of the share holders who own the bank. On 
the one hand the management and owners are very interested in the successful 
operation of the bank in respect of achieving the appropriate rates of profit, as 
it provides for the appropriate market value of the bank and also the possibility 
of the bank to attract additional capital in the open market (through additional 
issue of shares or the issue of short-term securities and bonds) On the other 
hand managers themselves are interested in achieving good results for reasons of 
prestige, ,which contributes to their better rating in the manager market. In this 
way the managers and owners take responsibility for the healthy and profitable 
operations of privatized banks. 202
Novo Plakalović
The  establishment  of  a  system  of  protection  and  responsibility  by  the  bank 
owners and managers in BH has been created on the basis of the completion of 
privatization and the restructuring of the entire system of commercial banks.
In mid 2007 99% of the entire equity of 9 banks in Republika Srpska was in private 
ownership and 86% of the capital was in foreign ownership. In the Federation 
there were 23 banks of which only 4 operated with majority local capital, having 
a rather small market share of 2,9%. Five state-owned banks accounted for 4,1%. 
Therefore, 14 banks with majority foreign capital had 93% of the market share. 
The four biggest banks held 69% of the bank market. This demonstrates the high 
degree of concentration in the banking sector of the Federation.
All business activities of banks in BH are under the supervision of the Entity 
Banking Agencies (those of the Federation of BH and Republika Srpska), which, 
on the basis of a number of decisions (around twenty) regulate and supervise 
the  operations  of  local  banks.  If  the  Agencies  observe  any  irregularities  or 
disrespect for their decisions or other legal regulations by a bank, the bank is 
warned and requested to remove the observed shortcomings. If necessary, other 
measures are also taken including the ultimate measure of revoking the bank’s 
operating license. The Agencies also have a broader discretionary right to react 
in cases where they judge that a bank, although not violating the law, is operating 
carelessly, and they intervene with the appropriate measures.
Bank supervision in the Entities is carried out on the basis of the regulatory 
framework which was harmonized between the Entities. For a long time now 
there has been a debate going on about bringing the Entity Agencies under the 
umbrella of the Central Bank of BH, which, according to the law governing the 
Central Bank of BH, has the function of coordinating the operations of the Entity 
Agencies. In this way, banking regulation and supervision would be combined. 
It seems that there is a general agreement on this issue, but there remain the 
dilemmas of whether the unique supervision would apply only to the banking 
sector or to the entire financial system, whether supervision would be placed 
within  the  CBBH  or  would  be  a  separate  independent  agency,  and  whether 
supervisors would be located in Sarajevo or in Banja Luka (IMF, 2006 p 18).
The IMF staff’s attitude is that unique supervision should initially cover banks 
and  leasing  as  the  growing  activity  substituting  the  bank  credit.  The  main 
argument of the IMF staff is that bringing supervision under the Central Bank 
or uniting it in a separate institution would insure the political independence 
of the supervision as has been achieved in the case of the CBBH. Theoretical SAFETY NETWORK SYSTEM IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
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literature on integrated supervision (meaning unique supervision of all financial 
institutions) is considered to be unconvincing (Čihak M. Podpiera R. 2006 p.25). 
Among observers the prevailing attitude is that there is no optimal supervisory 
structure but there are different pro et con arguments which need to be considered 
in individual countries’ cases. The findings of research have shown that unique 
supervision shows better consistency in respect to the quality of supervision, but 
to a great extent it is explained by the degree of development of the countries 
where supervision is integrated. Placing the supervision under the central bank 
or outside it has no significant impact on the quality of supervision. Integration of 
supervision does not effect a significant staff reduction. Benefits from integration 
are achieved if it is done medium to long term. The supervision covers the lender 
of last resort, deposit insurance and supervision, and their roles are related, thus 
requiring a higher degree of coordination. As supervisory institutions have been 
established with different mandates it is possible that conflicts might appear.
A study exists that shows that one regulator leads to insufficient monitoring of 
banks and sub-optimal bank investment in credits. It can also lead to restraint 
in lending. In the case of asymmetry of information among regulators it is more 
useful to determine in advance the rates of last resort lending. If it is not possible 
to determine such rates, then it is a good idea that the Central Bank and deposit 
insurance should act as lenders of last resort. In such a structure it is important 
that lending of last resort should not be insured in order to decrease the tendency 
to lend excessively. Asymmetry of information among regulators is present and 
they do not show initiatives to share the gathered information. As some regulators 
find it easier to collect special information, this leads to the conclusion that the 
allocation of banking regulation has some advantages (Santos A.C. J. Kahn M.C. 
2001).
Strong regulation and supervision are an important part of a safe and sound 
banking  system.  In  many  developing  countries  supervision  is  strengthening 
but it is a complex and expensive process as human resources are modest and 
supporting institutions are weak. Research into a sample of 39 countries shows 
that in the countries where supervision relies more on the Basel Core Principles, 
the banking systems are healthier (Demirguc-Kunt A. At all 2006 p.14). The 
countries requiring the banks to present their reports to regulators and market 
participants regularly and accurately have banks with much higher ratings as the 
timely disclosure of high quality information strengthens the monitoring and 
control by supervisors and markets. The countries that wish to improve banking 
regulation and supervision have to make the supply of information a priority in 
relation to other Basel Core Principles. This is related to a certain type of sensitive 204
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information which would be treated as confidential by supervisors, and the banks 
should know that such information will remain confidential with the supervisors 
and their supervisory partners in other countries. 
Providing  information  is  the  basic  condition  for  effective  discipline.  These 
recommendations are in accordance with those provided in a number of studies by 
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006). They emphasize the significance of mechanisms 
strengthening the market discipline and they are sceptical about structures that 
give too much power to regulators.
One of the key institutional improvements in BH would be the strengthening 
of the information base of the banks as regards financial status and operations 
of legal entities and bank clients, thus enabling both better knowledge of clients 
and risk avoidance. A lot has been done in this respect by establishing the single 
registry of bank clients - credit users. However, rating agencies, which would 
represent  another  important  source  of  information  on  credit  applicants  (in 
addition to the bank’s internal sources of information) are still missing. This is 
also required because the Basel II standards will be introduced in the near future 
with the necessary presence of other sources of information on clients beside 
the bank’s own sources, which will be necessary for many banks for the purpose 
of implementing the IRB approach (“Internal rating based approach”), i.e. the 
system of internal rating of clients.
Strengthening the principles of transparent and public bank operations effect the 
strengthening of market discipline and the public’s confidence in the banking 
system.
The highest degree of financial discipline expected from banks is related primarily 
to credit operations. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the credit culture of 
banks. The central issue is providing conditions for the realization of collateral 
and providing protective clauses, and strong monitoring is of key significance. 
Supervisory authorities have to provide precise estimations and classifications of 
credit portfolios and other assets and provide adequate allocations for potential 
loss provisions. In the BH banking system there is also the problem of adverse 
selection, i.e. it is known that debtors, individuals and companies with the most 
risky projects are prepared to pay the highest interest rates, which are rather 
high in BH, but such projects also have the biggest chances of failing. It is clear 
that such credit applicants are likely to be successful in obtaining credit as they 
expect significant profits and at the same time they are willing to accept a very SAFETY NETWORK SYSTEM IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
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high interest rate. Large losses of banks in lending operations can lead directly to 
financial crises. In order to avoid this, the following is necessary:
•	 detailed	checks	and	efficient	monitoring
•	 establishing	of	a	long-term	relationship	with	the	client
•	 significant	protective	clauses
•	 collateral	and	compensational	balance
•	 credit	rationing	(which	to	some	extent	local	banks	have	already	been	doing	for	
a long time).
In addition to good quality of lending decisions making, we should also take 
into account the importance of institutional surroundings, i.e. the capacity of 
institutions to provide adequate support for safer bank operations. It cannot be said 
that the optimum conditions have been reached in BH and further improvements 
of the institutional market structure such as regulations and courts are necessary 
For several years, the Entity agencies have stressed in their reports the need for 
the upgrade of the institutional surrounding, i.e. judicial and legislative "logistics" 
which could greatly improve the efficiency of banks' operations. Efficient courts 
would solve court proceedings faster, particularly the execution of collaterals 
and mortgages. According to the IFC data resolving a court proceeding in BH 
lasts on average 595 days (Banks in BH, March 2007 p.56). In relation to this 
problem it has also been suggested that special departments in courts to deal 
with economic disputes should be established. The Agency of the Federation has 
suggested passing a special law that would provide better protection of creditors' 
rights and stress the responsibility of debtors. It is certain that a number of other 
regulations are necessary to strengthen financial discipline. The Agency of the 
Federation thinks that it is necessary to have a law or at least to improve the 
existing regulations regarding safety and protection of the currency in banks and 
in transport, as this would also decrease the operative risks of banks.
2. Supervision, the Central Bank and Bank Stability 
In the report to the Executive Board of the IMF on Article IV Consultation for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the stability of the local financial sector is estimated 
to be quite good (IMF, 2007). Some of the key indicators, such as uncollectible 
loans and return on equity are improving. According to the Financial Sector 206
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Assessment Programme (FSAP) recommendations1, the Central Bank of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (CBBH) has established the Financial Stability Unit within 
the CBBH which should provide frequent estimates of financial sector trends 
and potential risks. As there is room for the removal of other weaknesses, bank 
supervisors have started to work on stricter loan classification with the objective 
of introducing it into practice in the following months. The authorities support 
the recommendation of the FSAP that the Banking Agencies should accept it in 
order to decrease the requirement for the maturity adjustment of a bank’s assets 
and liabilities and improve the banks’ liquidity and weaken the relation between 
credit expansion and incurring of debts abroad (IMF, 2007).
A less positive assessment of banking supervision relates to the unrealized intention 
to centralize the supervision in one institution instead of the two existing Entity 
Agencies. In this case the opinion is that “the authorities mainly agree” that a 
unique, independent and efficient supervisor at the state level, either in the CBBH 
or as an independent institution, would be more efficient in keeping financial 
stability. Such expectations may be realistic, but it cannot be said that supervision 
has been inefficient so far: to the contrary it has been very efficient as this is the 
best regulated sector of the local economy, and its stability is recognized by all 
the observers, The unique supervision is expected to provide better international 
cooperation which would be consistent with the suggested approach of creating 
a single economic area in BH. The authorities still stress that the decision on 
the final regulation of banking supervision has significant political implications. 
While waiting for the final resolution of this issue, the CBBH is trying to improve 
the coordination of the banking system supervision, which it is entitled to do 
according to the CBBH law.
The usual component of bank protection through the function of the central 
bank’s role as the lender of last resort is still missing due to the rule of the 
currency board, present for ten years in the CBBH, which to some extent makes 
the safety network incomplete. The only possibility available to banks at the 
moment is to take care of their liquidity by keeping a larger volume of financial 
reserves in their accounts as a precaution or by using the credit of other banks, 
i.e. withdrawal of liquid funds from mother banks in foreign countries, which is 
a common practice. However, it is possible that in the future the currency board 
system could be relaxed and the CBBH start carrying out this function as well. 
Regarding the monetary regulation instruments, the CBBH uses the mandatory 
1  Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) - programme performed by IMF staff in the 
member countries, providing certain recommendationsSAFETY NETWORK SYSTEM IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
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reserve requirement, at a rate which is currently 18% . Taking into account the 
limited effectiveness of this instrument in monetary policy, it should not be 
changed too frequently.
The Central Bank has a key role in maintaining the stability of the financial 
system. The sources of vulnerability are the underestimation of credit risk by 
banks (especially foreign banks) and reliance on cheaper foreign sources of funds 
for local lending. In this respect, the CBBH has created credit registries for legal 
and physical entities. It should be pointed out that there is a need to integrate 
the use of these registries into bank regulation and the work of supervisors. By 
loosening the current requirements for maturity adjustment, the CBBH allows 
the banks to rely more on the cheap local short-term deposits for lending, instead 
of cheap foreign sources, and not to rely too much on potentially changeable 
capital flows. The introduction of a bigger reserve requirement for banks’ foreign 
liabilities would decrease their cost advantages, yet the experience from other 
countries in the region shows that it would also de-stimulate intermediation.
It should be taken into account that bank operations in BH are much riskier than 
in Western countries (economically unreliable clients with high credit risk and 
no long business tradition, poor and undeveloped mechanisms of risk protection, 
inappropriate institutional surroundings). This is primarily reflected in more 
strict standards (the required capital rate of 12% in relation to risk weighted assets, 
while the standard rate is 8%). For these reasons, more rigorous regulations and 
bank supervision are necessary. The appropriate mechanisms and institutions 
that could efficiently restructure failed banks and provide possible additional 
funds for their financial recovery are also missing.
The Deposit Insurance Agency in BH based in Banja Luka insures small deposits 
up to KM 7,500, with the objective of raising the limit to KM 10,000 and in the 
long-term reaching the European standard of insuring deposits up to EUR 20,000 
(Nevjestić J. March 2007, p. 17). Actually all deposits (up to the legal limits) are 
included in the insurance scheme, as 97% of deposits and 98% of savings deposits 
are placed in insured banks.
Supervision, stable currency, and a privatized and relatively stable banking system 
have effected a significant increase in the volume of citizens’ bank savings, and a 
corresponding strong growth in the volume of lending. The growing confidence 
of the public is due to the fact that foreign ownership capital dominates the local 
banking system.208
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Although  the  domestic  banking  system  is  consolidated  with  the  established 
mechanisms of protection, it should be taken into account that absolute safety and 
protection of the financial sector does not exist even in developed, industrialized 
countries with highly developed financial structures and does not exist here 
either. Banking system crises have been much more frequent and much stronger 
in the developing countries and transition economies. The cost of solving them 
has amounted to USD 250 billion, paid for by bank depositors and creditors of 
failed banks but principally by the governments of those countries. (Honohan 
P. 2007 p. 3). Individual failures of banks are inevitable; however the objective 
is to keep the system as the whole stable. In industrialized countries there are 
often problems in bank operations so bankruptcies occur, or problem banks are 
restructured, acquired by stronger institutions in a bank merger or rehabilitated 
by state agencies. In BH we have the system of protection for small depositors but 
large depositors need to diversify their financial assets and investments as the 
most effective form of. protection. 
One of the significant reasons for the appearance of financial crises in banking is 
related to the processes of liberalization in the financial sector or, more precisely, 
to the periods of transition in that process (Stiglitz, E.J. Greenwald B. 2003. p. 220). 
In this respect, the focus is on the standards of capital adequacy. It is explained 
by  opening  possibilities  for  higher  profitability  and  growth  of  competition 
(with the decrease of profitability) with the consequential involvement in more 
risky operations by banks. At the same time, deregulation makes supervision 
more difficult due to the increased complexity of the task. Generally, financial 
liberalization  brings  benefits  to  countries  in  the  form  of  financial  sector 
strengthening, as shown by research (Bailliu J., 2000). Financial liberalization 
contributes to the development of the local capital market in new economies: 
however once a moderate level of regulatory and institutional development is 
reached it does not follow that less developed countries will realize those benefits 
(Chin, M. Ito H. 2005).
In the Eastern Asian crisis a large part of the responsibility was placed on the 
countries themselves, which had not provided for strong supervisory institutions. 
In fact there is no precise recipe for building strong regulatory and supervisory 
institutions. The problem should be observed in the context of the fact that even 
developed countries with strong institutions have not avoid significant financial 
crises (Scandinavia) and strong countries with transparent governance structures 
have failed to establish strong institutions. On the other hand, in some countries 
with strong institutions (the Central Bank of Thailand is one of the strongest in 
developing countries) those institutions weakened with the liberalization process. SAFETY NETWORK SYSTEM IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
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So, as concluded by Stiglitz and Greenwald, it is not sufficient if institutions 
are sound before liberalization: they need to be strong enough to endure the 
inevitable process of weakening which is part of the liberalization process, and the 
liberalization itself needs to be conducted so as to minimize damage, which has 
not been given sufficient attention in the past. Even when the regulators are aware 
of the difficulties they face a difficult task as when liberalization is announced the 
initiatives to take larger risks are automatically present.
The Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) which is implemented by 
the IMF in the South-Eastern European countries shows that significant progress 
has been made in those countries with regard to financial reforms since the period 
of financial turbulence in the nineties. It has resulted in greater financial stability 
and resistance to exposure to financial risks. However on the basis of experiences 
from other parts of the world it is recommended that financial supervision and 
regulation be further developed, particularly because financial risks arising from 
a fast credit growth and potential macroeconomic imbalances could be realized 
in the future (Maehler M.A. et al. 2007 p.3).
Returning to the local field, i.e. to the market in BH, one should be aware that 
the problems and tasks of the local regulators and supervisors are becoming 
increasingly complex as besides the general dangers related to the intensified 
credit  expansion  potential  there  are  other  problems  such  as  macroeconomic 
instability and, the slowly broadening range of financial institutions and activities 
performed by them, which make supervision increasingly difficult. The banks 
operating here are often members of significant banking groups which have more 
experience with supervision in the mother countries, so they can be in better 
position in relation to the requirements of local regulation and supervision.
3. Sources of Potential Dangers for the BH Banking System
3.1 Flows of Debt and Potentials for Crises
The flows of debts incurred abroad are much less stable than other types of inflows 
and they are easily reversible at time of crises. It is more likely that reversible 
flows of international capital will take place among the countries that rely more 
on the flows of debt including bank credits and less on foreign direct investments. 
Short-term bank credits to developing countries are pro-cyclic and they tend to 
increase during the economic expansion (boom) and rapidly decrease during the 
economic decline (the World Bank, 2000). The pro-cyclic behaviour results in the 210
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highly unstable character of these flows which can intensify the reverse impact of 
negative shocks on the economic growth.
The  appearance  of  financial  crises  is  directly  related  to  the  processes  of 
globalization and internationalization of international capital flows (Kaminsky 
L.G., Schmukler L.S. 2003 p.4). Therefore, Krugman (1998) believes that the 
control of capital can help at least temporarily to prevent the disorderly withdrawal 
of capital. These discussions on introducing old restrictions on the capital flows 
have been reintroduced. On the other hand the advantages of liberalization, such 
as the improvement of the functioning of the financial system, the growth of 
the available financial assets, and risk diversification, are stressed intensively by 
numerous countries.
The opening of debt flows could lead to an “extravagant government” and give 
the financial sector that is subject to poor supervision much more space, which 
will increase vulnerability to shocks. In their two studies, McKinnon and Pill 
(1996,  1998)  examine  the  problem  of  excessive  lending  by  banks  in  case  of 
financial liberalization without adequate supervision. They provide a theoretical 
model in which the moral hazard in the local financial market and unrestricted 
capital flow together create a potential for disaster. They further show that an 
open capital account can intensify the reverse effect of poor supervision of the 
financial sector by allowing banks to expose their balance sheets to currency risk 
and enabling them to have open speculative positions in foreign currency. It is 
interesting that the countries with unfavourable conditions tend to rely more on 
short-term external debts, denominated in foreign currency, as the main source of 
foreign capital. It creates vulnerability, especially when the local financial system, 
through which such capital is extended, is undeveloped and poorly supervised. 
Such a situation is to a great extent characteristic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
There is a systematic empirical relationship between the exposure to short-term 
debt and the probability of the appearance of financial crises. Literature, i.e. 
research on early warning clearly shows that a high level of short-term external 
debt denominated in foreign currencies significantly increases vulnerability to 
financial crises (Berg, A. Borensztein E., Pattillo C. 2004). These findings are not 
surprising as currency and maturity non-adjustments of debt structures have 
often been present in countries that have had crises. The rate of short-term debt 
compared to foreign reserves is very significant for predicting financial crises 
in emerging economies. Rodrik and Velasco (2000) show that countries with 
a higher short-term debt than foreign exchange reserves are three times more 
likely to experience a sudden and large change in financial flows. The results of SAFETY NETWORK SYSTEM IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
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their research also show that the crisis becomes more serious as the exposure to 
short-term debt increases.
Even if it is likely that the flow of debt, especially with short-term maturity, is 
accompanied by less desirable results, it cannot be automatically concluded that 
prohibition to incur debts would always have a positive effect. Banks in developing 
countries have little choice other than to generate liquidity through short-term 
debts  with  the  aim  to  finance  illiquid  projects  in  a  low  quality  investment 
surrounding. The implications for developing countries are that they become 
more vulnerable to potential financial crises. Generally this is not a result of their 
larger stocks of short-term debt, but is an undesired consequence of illiquidity, 
low credit ability and investment possibilities in such countries (Diamond D. 
Rajan, R. 2001). The countries poor in capital have little or no access to shares, i.e. 
portfolio investments and inflows based on foreign direct investments and FDI 
inflows. They can still benefit from debt inflow for financing illiquid investments 
although this might potentially bring more risk. Short-term debt could be a useful 
and obligatory instrument for strengthening macroeconomic policy, although 
debt to foreign countries increases the vulnerability to external shocks.
3.2 Macroeconomic Determinants
The dangers that might appear in the BH financial system, at the global level, are 
related primarily to unfavourable capital flows between the country and foreign 
countries. The disastrous scenario of enormous withdrawal of foreign exchange 
deposits by foreign owners and panic conversion of the local currency into foreign 
cash by the local residents is, of course, a less likely scenario. In case of a disaster, 
the intervention of the IMF is usually expected as the lender of last resort at the 
international level. Therefore one can speak, to some degree, about moral hazard 
towards the IMF, as contrary to the claims from the “Mussa theorem” (Mussa M. 
2004) and other authors, according to whom there is no danger of moral hazard 
because of regular credit repayment to the IMF.
It is clear that larger withdrawal of foreign exchange deposits and cash could 
have a stressful or even disastrous effect. The foreign exchange reserves of the 
Central Bank of BH at the beginning of 2008 exceeded the level of KM 6.6 billion 
(around EUR 3.3 billion). More than half of the created foreign exchange reserves 
come from the inflow of funds into the BH banking system through deposits, 
credits and investments in shares made by the “parent” banks. These capital 
flows are larger than those expressed in the balance of payments as the previously 
stated categories are included in the balance of payments and in foreign direct 212
Novo Plakalović
investments (Caruana J. Deppler M. 2006 p 16). The reserves have also been 
growing  because  of  greater  foreign  assistance,  which  had  been  continuously 
declining in previous years so had a smaller impact on the creation of foreign 
exchange reserves in the Central Bank. According to IMF experts the growth of 
foreign reserves related to the banking sector i.e. investments in the local banks 
by mother banks, is accompanied by the danger of their decrease because of 
financing a high current account deficit. 
The continuity of citizens’ trust in the local currency would limit the withdrawal 
of foreign exchange reserves, but if the conversion of the local currency into 
euro deposits and of KM deposits into euros were to become more intensive the 
existing foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank would be endangered. The 
size of the deficit would determine the size of the decrease in foreign exchange 
reserves in case of a reduced inflow of euro funds through the banking system. 
This stresses the importance for macroeconomic policy of decreasing the foreign 
trade deficit with the purpose of reducing the risk of financial instability. Foreign 
exchange reserve risk lies first of all in the fact that a relatively high level of 
euroization is present in BH, that the foreign exchange rate has been fixed for 
ten years now through the currency board arrangement, that the banks are in 
foreign ownership and rely on external sources of funds, and that large external 
imbalances are present.
The fact is that the growth of credits to the private sector in BH has been mainly 
directed to the household sector. There are clear indications that such a strong 
growth of credits to citizens has had a much larger negative impact on the growth 
of the trade imbalance (a very strong growth of imports compared to exports, 
i.e. very low coverage of imports by own exports) than credits to companies. It 
is also shown by empirical research by Kanda D. (2006) with an econometric 
model on the basis of which the conclusion was reached that the best results in 
correcting the foreign trade deficit would be achieved by restricting the credits 
to households. It is also stated in the research that fiscal expenditures are the 
variable with direct influence on the trade imbalance, followed by credit flows 
and fiscal revenues, so it is concluded that a direct correction in the restriction of 
fiscal spending would be necessary.
Observing  the  relative  power  of  fiscal  or  credit  policy  to  decrease  the  trade 
imbalance, empirical projections start from the given large tax burden and fiscal 
policy assessment which would be focused on the restriction of expenditures. It 
is assumed that credits to the private sector should remain the same as in 2005. 
In a one year period, it is indicated that fiscal restriction by 1 percentage of GDP SAFETY NETWORK SYSTEM IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
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would generate 0,45 percent of GDP of decrease in foreign trade deficit, where the 
decline of credit flows by 1% of GDP would at the same time generate the decrease 
of the trade deficit by 0,44% of GDP. Fiscal and credit restrictions would have 
approximately the same effect on the decrease of foreign trade deficits during one 
year.
The author further observes that the currency board arrangement and the open 
capital account of BH mean that it is very difficult to target a certain credit growth 
rate. Generally, credit restriction could be achieved through the strengthening 
of required reserves or tighter prudential regulations. However as the banking 
system relies on banks in the mother countries with easy access to liquid funds 
these  instruments  would  obviously  be  inefficient.  This  means  that  the  only 
instrument that remains available is the fiscal policy which could affect the trade 
balance. In practice, the restriction of demand in the short term would be focused 
on fiscal policy. In the long-term, deep structural reforms would be necessary to 
bring the trade deficit to a sustainable level.
In the sample of 180 countries, BH stands out as the country with high external 
deficits. The countries with deficits higher than 15% of GDP belong to the group 
of economies with low revenue. Current account deficits in BH amounted to 
–13.3% in 2001, -19.1% the following year, -20.9% in 2003, -19.3% in 2004 and 
–21.3% in 2005 (Kanda D. 2006 p 22). According to this, BH is also outside the 
sample of countries with currency boards (except for small countries on islands). 
No country that had an active currency board had such a high deficit (Argentina 
had 3% of GDP) during the period when such a system was in effect. External 
imbalances are only one of the indicators of potential monetary instability. Other 
indicators are the poor export performance of the economy, instability of the 
financial sector, low or declining foreign exchange reserves, fast growth of money 
supply and credits, slow growth of real GDP, domestic inflation and fiscal deficit. 
In BH some of those indicators are positive, such as foreign exchange reserves, 
inflation and fiscal balance, and strong banks. Others deserve attention. While 
the fiscal balance is strong its structure is weak, with a significant accompanying 
risk. The growth of GDP has slowed down from the 2000s to date, and bank 
credits have been expanding (Zeuner J. 2005 p 35).
The relation between currency instability and previous credit expansion was noted 
a long time ago. In the study by authors Caprio G. and Klingebiel D. (2003) crises 
have been identified i.e. the periods of instability in banking when the majority 
or all of the banking capital in the country was destroyed. There have been 117 
crises in 93 countries since the nineteen-seventies. Zeuner J. (2006) compares the 214
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trend of the credit rate to the private sector in relation to GDP for 140 countries in 
the same period. The credit boom has been defined as a cumulative credit growth 
to the private sector during three years amounting to 10 percentage points or 
more. The conclusion is that a prolonged credit boom increases the probability 
of bank crises. Out of the sample of 140 countries, 74 countries had at least one 
episode of difficulties in the banking sector. Out of 74 countries, 22 experienced 
the growth of credits to the private sector exceeding 10 percentage points in the 
three preceding years. 
Around 40 percent of the credit boom was related to these 22 countries, which 
indicates a high frequency of bank instability in countries with a credit boom. 
In the countries with a fast credit growth, the relation between the crisis and 
the fast credit growth is strong although not inevitable. In the countries with 
greater financial depth, i.e. credit growth over 25%, the crisis is more likely in 
the beginning (75% of the 22 countries with a fast credit growth and financial 
crisis). In the countries with growth below 25%, only a quarter experienced a 
crisis. Therefore in the countries with initially low financial depth the probability 
that a crisis will appear on the basis of the credit boom is lower but remains 
significant.  The  majority  of  those  countries  went  through  instability  at  the 
beginning of transition in the early nineties before the start of the credit boom. 
After the boom, crises took place in three countries: Poland in 1993, Bulgaria in 
1996 and Slovakia in 1997.
It is not clear if the recent appearance of crises are related to credit growth. 
International experience shows that it happens in the continuation of credit 
expansion. However in many respects the economy of BH does not correspond 
with the sample of transition countries. The comparisons with other countries 
with currency boards show that credit growth was significant in those countries 
before the difficulties in the banking sector took place. The conclusion is that 
international data shows that a fast credit growth is one of the most important 
indicators that difficulties in the banking sector will appear. Numerous studies 
show that such significant and accelerated credit growth precedes such events. 
The probability of difficulties in banking following the credit expansion exceeds 
20 percent, depending on the data and the methodology used.
The popping of the credit balloon costs a lot. As the experience of transition 
economies is short it is difficult to draw conclusions from the experiences of this 
small group of countries. Even compared to these countries, credit expansion 
in BH is strong and it seems to be atypical so it deserves special attention. Some 
empirical research shows that the foreign exchange rate regime has an impact SAFETY NETWORK SYSTEM IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
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on banking crises probability. Economies with a rigid foreign exchange rate are 
more vulnerable to moderate economic challenges. In such cases, commercial 
banks tend to underestimate foreign exchange risk if the foreign exchange rate 
is fixed and extend credits in the local currency on the basis of credits taken in 
foreign currency.
However this is not the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as banks lend in the local 
currency on the basis of indexation in a foreign currency (euro). More than half 
of the credits to the economy and citizens have been extended in this way and 
no one asks for a credit at a lower interest rate, which would compensate for the 
takeover of foreign exchange risk arising from the indexation. According to one 
interpretation the reason is high confidence in the local currency and according 
to another the credit users are not aware of this technical condition in their credit 
contracts. If such a high degree of indexation is present it indicates primarily that 
consumers are not sophisticated enough rather than signalling high confidence 
in the KM - or the truth is somewhere in the middle. (Kanda D. 2005 p. 11).
BH  also  shows  other  features  that  accompany  financial  instability  at  the 
international  level.  Such  factors  are  an  unsustainable  macroeconomic  policy 
as in Argentina in 2001, full liberalization in the absence of an adequate and 
appropriate prudential regulation base as in Chile in 1984, the direct effects 
of fiscal difficulties on the local banking system as in Argentina, shocks of the 
conditions of exchange and change in foreign exchange rates as in Venezuela in 
1994, and political instability and civil conflicts which can accompany banking 
difficulties. To a certain degree, according to the IMF experts, BH shows some 
of  these  weaknesses  including  the  unsolved  state  debts,  fiscal  pressures  and 
exposure to regional instability.
It cannot be said with certainty that, taking into account the features of the 
BH  economy,  a  banking  crisis  will  take  place.  It  cannot  be  excluded  either, 
considering many elements of concern which are characteristic of the real and 
financial sectors of the BH economy which do not exclude the possibility of the 
appearance of a banking crisis. The problems of credit expansion and external 
deficit are important but they are not unique in international comparisons. The 
countries where such or similar features were present had disproportions but 
they did not always experience later periods of instability. Other dimensions 
of economic behaviour together with international instability in BH may have 
varied effects. Even with the possibility that GDP is underestimated, there seems 
to be a good basis for moderate credit growth and lower external imbalance in 
BH, which guarantees stability, according to the evaluations of the IMF experts.216
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3.3 Microeconomic Factors
Local  credit  expansion  is  financed  by  funds  withdrawn  by  daughter  banks 
from their mother banks in foreign countries. Of all bank inflows from foreign 
countries, 70% are for this purpose (Caruana J. Deppler M. 2006 p. 14). These 
funds are obtained at the EURIBOR interest rate plus 150 to 250 basis points so the 
costs of these funds amount to 4-5 percent. These percentages are below the local 
interest rate on long-term euro deposits while the interest on euro indexed long-
term credits was from 7% to 11%. The local deposits are mainly short-term, and as 
banks give long-term credits they need to rely on foreign long-term deposits.
Euro indexed credits are mainly based on long-term euro deposits and credits 
from foreign countries and the local short-term deposits represent the excess 
reserves. Banks hold local short-term deposits in euros with counterpart banks 
in foreign countries. Such segmentation contributes to the vulnerability of the 
financial sector due to a bad relationship between bank lending and capital flows. 
It also leads to the bank transfer of residents’ euro deposits to foreign countries 
rather then using them for local financing. The reduction of such balance sheet 
segmentation is recommended. The funds obtained abroad are in euro, credits 
are extended in KM with indexation in euros. Conversion of euros into KM 
when extending a credit in the local currency brings about a significant increase 
of foreign exchange reserves. Naturally foreign reserves also grow on the basis 
of  help  and  credits  that  the  country  receives  and  inflows  based  on  private 
remittances and spending in the country. The reduction of the inflow of bank 
assets would have the opposite effect on the level of foreign reserves. Confidence 
in the local currency prevents this, but any higher dynamic of conversion of 
KM into euros or domestic deposits into euros would cause a further decrease 
of foreign exchange reserves. Risks for the decline of foreign exchange reserves 
arise from numerous macroeconomic and financial features of the BH economy 
such as high euroization, fixed foreign exchange rate, and the large reliance of the 
banking system, largely in foreign ownership, on foreign sources of funds and 
high external imbalances.
The possible abandonment of the currency board system and devaluation of the 
local currency could bring the entire banking system into crisis as credits are 
mainly made with the foreign exchange clause. It would cause a large pressure 
on debtors, who will in the future probably be even more burdened with debt2. 
2  The increase of the exchange rate of the currency that the credit contract is limited to brings 
about the increase of the principal of debt in the local currency. With the possible increase of 
interest rates in the market, the burden of debt increases if flexible rates are contracted.SAFETY NETWORK SYSTEM IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
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This is probable considering the scenarios in neighbouring countries. The debt of 
citizens and companies in BH is still not high compared to Croatia and Serbia, 
so that there is still some remaining space to incur additional debt, not only for 
citizens but also for companies, as less credit has been extended to them to date.
There  is  always,  everywhere,  the  risk  of  a  large  withdrawal  of  deposits  that 
can jeopardize the banking system (Rose P. 2003 p. 491). The ensuing danger 
is excessive involvement in dangerous operations, “the moral hazard”. Efficient 
protection from the consequences of such operations is provided by an adequate 
volume of bank capital. However, the issue of capital was raised a long time 
ago, and the “proper” volume has not been clearly defined either in practice or 
in theory. Although much progress has been made in banking research since 
the Basel agreement in 1988 there is still no agreement on the optimal design 
of bank capital regulation. Modern banking theory is still being developed. For 
example there is no answer regarding the relative efficiency of various financial 
intermediaries in the processing and aggregating of information. There is also 
no complete understanding of optimal allocation of risk among different holders 
of claims in the general balance model (Santos J. 2000 p 23). Increase of the 
minimum capital requirement can increase bank stability but it is a potential 
source of costs which are easily overlooked. The increase of operating costs in the 
banking business can lead to inefficiency as mediation through other financial 
intermediaries is not a perfect substitute for bank intermediation. The increase 
of the share of bank capital in the economy can be expensive as bonds are not a 
perfect substitute.
The main issue is whether capital is the key indicator of the safety of a bank’s 
operations. Empirical research has found that more important indicators are 
profit and costs, which, if inadequate, better indicate potential problems in the 
bank.
The crucial public interest is to preserve the financial stability of the system i.e. 
undisturbed functioning of the payment system. The biggest danger is banks’ 
risky behaviour i.e. involvement in dangerous operations or so-called “moral 
hazard”.
Generally, potential causes of crises in transition and emerging markets are the 
following:
•	 poor	functioning	of	the	legal	system	which	makes	difficult	the	use	of	collateral	
and protective provisions218
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•	 slow	bankruptcy	procedures
•	 low	efficiency	of	collateral	collection	(Mishkin	F.	2006	p	188)
In a highly competitive banking system such as ours, there is a realistic danger 
that banks, competing for clients, i.e. credit users, will not be so thorough in 
checking somebody's actual debt (the credit registry of credit users, companies 
and citizens in the Central Bank has only recently become operational). Although 
there is a high degree of concentration in banking the domestic banking market 
is competitive and there is a danger of banks loosening the conditions of lending, 
which, together with poor accounting standards and poor financial reporting 
can result in excessive risk exposure.
Research has shown that in circumstances of asymmetric information available 
to credit applicants and banks, banks prefer clients with minor deviations from 
historically average rates of return and with whom they have established good 
long-term relations. Therefore the primary clients are those with a well known 
productive function and long-term credit history. If market imperfections are 
present to a higher degree the interest margin can be wider (Blavy R. 2005 p. 
25). The high costs of termination of the credit contract make banks accumulate 
bad credits on their balance sheets. If there are non-economical reasons such as 
lending to related parties this is intensified. The consequence is turning to well 
known clients with a well known productive function and long-term stable return 
which affects the widening of the interest margin i.e. the spread of deposit and 
credit prices where depositors receive a lower interest rate and potential credit 
users receive more expensive credit. It is reinforced in the conditions of limited 
competition as in monopolistic surroundings.
Studies in the practice of banking in the USA point out the basic indicators of 
a damaged credit culture. They are related to larger transactions with related 
parties while sound operating principles are disobeyed. Failure to respect credit 
rules arises when credits with higher risk of repayment are extended under 
dissatisfactory conditions with full awareness of deviation from these principles. 
The reason for this is operating with related parties, the concern related to the 
realization of income and competitive pressure on key markets. When credit data 
is incomplete the result is the inadequate estimation of the debtor's credit ability. 
Inadequate business practice is reflected in the absence of proper supervision of 
well-known debtors, reliance on verbal information instead of financial reports, 
optimistic  interpretations  of  well-known  credit  weaknesses,  the  ignoring  of 
warning signs related to a particular debtor and neglecting indicators and the 
situation in the macro surrounding. It happens when there is no credit collection SAFETY NETWORK SYSTEM IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
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procedure or there is no appropriate legal procedure. The absence of effective 
monitoring can cause the originally good credits to bring about problems and 
losses. Credit officers' lack of professional skills in the analysis of financial reports 
and the estimation of relevant credit data causes problems. Extension of credits 
with an initially low level of financial risk to the amount exceeding the reasonable 
repayment ability of the debtor is a frequent problem in unstable economies 
with changeable interest rates. Extending credits where the participation in the 
financial costs compared to the total investment of the owner is too high easily 
leads to problems. Problems can also be connected with credits based on the 
expectations of the successful completion of a business transaction instead of the 
credit ability of the debtor, and also credits extended for the speculative purchase 
of securities or goods. The same applies to credits to companies in problem 
regions and activities. The credits extended due to large bank deposits without 
economic justification bring high risks. Finally, problem credits can be those 
based on the collateral which has a suspicious liquidation value or insured credits 
where appropriate insurance margins are missing (Greuning H. Bratanović S. 
2006. p. 150).
Operative risk is present in BH banking and it is related to possible mistakes 
in the quality control, inefficient supply of services, and mistakes in managers’ 
estimates. Operative risk is related to criminals and fraud which can be carried 
out by staff members or outsiders. With the expansion of the ATM network, we 
can expect a bigger volume of criminal activity and risks for banks. Control of 
operative risk means preventing fraud by employees and mistakes in the supply of 
services, avoidance of accounting mistakes and computer defects and taking into 
account possible natural disasters and other damage that can happen to tangible 
assets.  Efficient  measures  are  the  purchase  of  appropriate  insurance  cover, 
maintenance of back up service capacities, internal control and information of 
the management, and contingency plans. It should be said that operative risk 
does not have a generally accepted measurement scale. It is not known how to 
calculate the quantity of the present exposure to risk and it is impossible to assess 
how such risk will change over time (Rose P. 2004 p. 505).
Risky elements in the BH financial system could include the enormous growth of 
domestic credit. From 2000 to 2004, the volume of bank credits tripled. Between 
2005 and 2006 credits in the Republika Srpska increased by 35%. This increase was 
mainly long-term credit extended to citizens and also general purpose consumer 
credit. Private companies account for 51% of credits, and citizens account for 
43%. In the Federation, private companies account for around 44% and citizens 
around 51%.220
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The excessive growth of the volume of credit endangers banks’ capacities to evaluate 
adequately credit applications. The worsening of the quality of approved credits is 
often not noticed in a new credit boom so bad credits are temporarily concealed 
and the appearance of the problem is postponed. Institutional weaknesses are 
reflected in the lack of adequate instruments of credit monitoring and corporate 
governance: poor accounting, audit, financial reporting and data disclosure, and 
in non-transparent ownership structures. Poor data quality is the basic reason 
why systems of risk management and risk measurement created for the conditions 
of developed countries are not effective in many countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. In BH it has been partly related to the non-existence of a credit bureau or 
registry and other sources of data, so mother banks cannot rely on estimates of 
credit risk or risk-adjusted return per share but need to rely on the local managers’ 
assessments. This is the reason banks rely on collateral and guarantors. Some 
improvements  have  already  been  made,  such  as  the  aforementioned  registry 
of companies’ and citizens’ credit with the central bank and the registry of 
collaterals. Underestimation of credit risk can arise also from the indexation 
of the majority of credits in the KM against the euro. Indexed credits are often 
extended to clients without protection from foreign exchange risk and in that way 
they indirectly increase credit risk. This credit risk can be underestimated due to 
moral hazard arising from the perception that the international community (the 
IMF) will not allow the currency board to fail, which results in underestimation 
and failure to provide sufficient loss provisions.
Objectives related to bank profits set by the parent banks (ROE) in relation to 
their subsidiary units could contribute to the risk of a stronger slow down of 
credit growth. According to data of the IMF experts those objectives for the 
banks in BH are between 20% and 25% of return on equity before taxation. Banks 
underestimating the increase of credit risk will try to achieve too ambitious 
objectives in respect of ROE after creating too low provisions. When the increased 
underestimation is recognized or when the risk is realized, banks will increase 
the rates of provisions according to the repeated estimations of credit risk by 
decreasing the projections of ROE. This could make the management of large 
foreign groups conclude that their ambitious objectives cannot be realized. In 
response  they  could  decide  to  decrease  the  credit  growth  depending  on  the 
degree to which they re-examine their long-term strategic objectives in BH and 
the region.
In  circumstances  of  high  credit  growth  clients’  lack  of  creditworthiness, 
insufficient transparency of their credit ability, and a very competitive lending 
environment can all lead to banks operating carelessly and becoming involved in SAFETY NETWORK SYSTEM IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
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dangerous credit activities. Evidence shows that increased competition directly 
increases banks’ lack of caution and their larger involvement in risky investments. 
Therefore in the current financial environment there is a real danger of weakening 
bank discipline. The financial discipline of banks is reflected in the following 
elements: the degree to which banks get involved in risks and the volume of risk 
taken, the proper assessment of risky investments, the proper valuation of assets 
and allocation of appropriate rates for potential loss provisions.
Credit monitoring, i.e. reporting on bad credits and non-performing credits, which 
might result in credit contraction, should not be liberal. Adequate classification 
of credit requires consideration of the debtor’s financial position, i.e. assessment 
of their net value, money flows, collateral and history of credit repayment. The 
example of Chile is given as the only country where banks classified the credit 
users according to their credit rating (Villar A. 2006 p. 102).
3.4 Financial Instability Risks
The biggest danger for the banking system is the possible appearance of bank 
insolvency. Good indicators of financial soundness combined with the capacity 
of foreign banks to receive help from parent banks lead to the conclusion that the 
banking system of BH is highly resistant to traditional solvency crises (Caruana 
J. Deppler M. 2006 p. 19). The capital in relation to risky assets (CAR indicator) 
significantly exceeds the required minimum of 12%. The fact is that the group of 
respectable foreign banks has a significantly lower capital rate, which reflects the 
strategy of these banks to maintain such low level of capital rate in their subsidiary 
units. The reason is the need to increase the ROE rate and rely on the possibility 
that mother banks could intervene if additional funds are necessary.
The stress test done by the IMF experts in 2007 shows that in the case of credit 
reclassification into bad loans with identification of a bigger than 15%, risk the 
group of significant foreign banks’ capital would decrease to below the required 
minimum, although those are the banks which could withdraw funds from 
mother banks.
This stress test is focused on risks for banks’ financial stability which might arise 
from larger reliance on potentially changeable inflows of capital extended through 
banks which are used to finance credit growth. The analysis is focused on liquidity 
risk which might arise from the slow-down of credit growth. It would then slow 
down the inflow of capital and cause potential effects that would arise in the next 
step, the conversion of KM into euros, but this would be limited by continuous 222
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trust in the KM. These two shocks might arise as the result of recognition of the 
volume of the taken credit risk or by transfer of effects from foreign countries. It 
can have a direct macroeconomic impact through more difficult lending but it can 
also have indirect effects through the impact on capital flows, which contribute to 
the potential for financial instability.
According to the conclusions of the IMF experts, the BH financial system is 
resistant to these sources of shock. The stress test has shown that the financial 
and monetary system could absorb relatively moderate losses of foreign exchange 
reserves  accompanied  by  the  reduction  of  credit  growth  and  capital  inflows 
that finance it. However when this loss of reserves is combined with the effects 
of the exchange of KM into euros, the total impact could be large enough to 
require more attention. Although it is very difficult to estimate the probability 
of financial instability, this stresses the importance of maintaining trust in the 
currency. For example ignoring the possible feedback effects - the scenario where 
two factors are combined, when credit growth is slowed down to zero with 10 
percentage points of the exchange of the local currency, the KM and deposits to 
euros - would decrease foreign exchange reserves by around 29% which would 
amount to 7.6 percents of GDP. The experts emphasize that this stress test is 
hypothetical and does not include predictions in any way. Particularly, they 
ignore macroeconomic feedback effects that would decrease the impact of shocks 
where the slow-down of credit activity would bring about recession, which would 
decrease the trade imbalance and slow down the loss of foreign exchange reserves. 
The stress test points out the need to strengthen financial supervision in order to 
adequately estimate these risks and develop policies that would take care of them 
and provide confidence.
The crisis prevention includes the adequate financial discipline and adequate 
control of supervisory authorities. With the dominant presence of foreign owned 
banks the local supervisors have to raise the quality of their work and increase 
the number of staff in order to better supervise the banks’ sophisticated activities 
and new “products”. It is also necessary to establish closer cooperation with 
supervisors from the home countries of banks operating in the local market. The 
Banking Agencies of BH have set up cooperation with the control supervisory 
institutions of banks from the countries whose banks have the majority ownership 
shares in the local banks. The basis for cooperation in most cases are bilateral 
memorandums of understanding. The areas of cooperation include: the exchange 
of information on the operations of banks in foreign ownership in the country 
and in the home country, exchange of information on the management, joint 
consultation and visits to banks in foreign ownership. The problem of cooperation SAFETY NETWORK SYSTEM IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
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is often related to different legal treatment of confidential data and information 
within different legal jurisdictions.
According to some polls conducted by the BIS, host supervisors are often not 
sufficiently informed about the situation of the mother bank. A special challenge 
is when the bank in foreign ownership is managed from a foreign country, i.e. 
the headquarters of the bank is in the foreign country and the management has 
a global perspective, meaning that different transactions are booked in various 
bank points world-wide. Thus some subsidiary banks can have a higher degree 
of concentration of certain risks. As information goes through local managers, 
the local authorities are often not well informed on the liquidity problems of the 
subsidiary bank. Various accounting standards also make problems, particularly 
with respect to the type of business performed by foreign banks in the host 
country. It is often the case that foreign subsidiary units have a minor significance 
for the mother bank but a large significance for the host country. The key question 
that arises is how the mother bank will react in case of difficulties of its subsidiary 
bank in a foreign country, which is very important for the host country, and of 
minor importance from the point of view of the bank from the home country 
(Mihaljek D. 2006 p. 60). There have been cases where the mother bank reacted 
without a request for assistance by the host country and cases when the mother 
bank refused to help its subsidiary bank. Mihaljek states the example of Riječka 
banka, the biggest Croatian bank, which in 2002 had losses, incurred through 
foreign exchange transactions, to the amount of USD 100 million, i.e. equal 
to three quarters of the bank’s capital. Germany’s Bayerische Landesbank, the 
owner of the capital, decided to sell its share of 59% for 1 dollar to the Croatian 
government when the losses were discovered. Later on, the Croatian government 
sold the same bank for EUR 55 million to Austrian Erste Bank. Mother banks 
might not help their daughters and local depositors in specific circumstances 
when the government freezes, expropriates or devalues the bank assets bringing 
about bank losses (as in the case of Argentina in 2001) or in case of fraud in the 
privatized bank which goes undetected by the foreign bank during the take-over 
(the case of Riječka banka). The response of the mother bank will depend on its 
financial strength. If it is poor the mother bank will care less about the reputation 
cost and will abandon its daughter bank.
For this reason the question arises if it would be better if the bank turned its 
subsidiary unit in the host country into its branch. Such a process took place in 
the European Union after the introduction of the single banking license. The 
centralized decision-making process in the global financial institutions actually 
makes the subsidiary bank act more or less as a branch. This makes irrelevant the 224
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question whether the mother bank will react in case of a stress of the branch or 
quasi branch, as legal claims are directed to the mother bank. The more important 
issue is if the central bank and supervisory authorities will be able to manage 
the loss of liquidity in the domestic banking system and the interruption in the 
payment system if the mother bank decides to close the branch, which is a small 
matter for the mother bank but systematically important for the host country.
Foreign banks are the key source of credit in BH. In 2005 they extended 84% 
of the total credit, and of this only 6 banks extended 65 percent of the total 
credit. Many banks carried out credit expansion in the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe as part of a wider strategy of their bank groups. Namely, in those 
countries, banks perform above the average profit rate. They try to increase the 
total yield rate on shares, compensating in this way for the low rates of return in 
their mother countries (Caruana J. Deppler M. 2006 p. 13). This strategy seems to 
be successful, as the profits in countries of Central and Eastern Europe constitute 
a disproportionally high share in the groups’ profit. For example Austrian bank 
groups earn 43% of their profits in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
although only 23% of their assets are invested in those countries.
Theoretical research suggests that foreign ownership in banking brings many 
benefits for the local economy (Mishkin S.F. 2006). Foreign banks provide access 
to foreign financial markets. They effect the improvement of the regulatory and 
supervisory structure in the local banking. They effect the improvement of credit 
quality and decrease the influence of the government on the financial sector. 
Foreign banks introduce new financial instruments and new technologies and 
influence the growth of banking competition, thus improving the quality of 
financial services. They increase the trust of the domestic public in respect to 
bank solvency. Empirical research confirms that foreign presence reduces bank 
costs and profits (Kose A. M. at al .2006).
The fast expansion of banks in foreign ownership in BH has contributed to 
financial stability but it has also created potential channels for the transfer of 
negative effects from other Central and Eastern European countries. This transfer 
of negative effects depends on the operations of the risk management systems in 
foreign banking groups.
Fast credit growth in the region has contributed to the creation of significant risks. 
The transfer of negative effects could take place when the risk in these countries is 
recognized and realized which would initiate repeated risk assessments. It would 
make banks consider their exposure in BH as a risky area. The consequence could SAFETY NETWORK SYSTEM IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
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be the slow-down or reduction of credit growth in BH. Development trends in 
the banking of mother countries could also make them decrease risk exposure 
in BH. 
A large asymmetry in the relative significance of bilateral credit exposure to BH 
and of the BH economy to foreign banks means that changes in the credit policies 
of parent banks directed from the perspective of those banks could have a large 
impact on BH. For example the exposure. of Austrian banks to BH is only 2 
percent of their total exposure in the region of Central and Eastern Europe but 
in BH their credit accounts for almost 70% of the total credit extended by foreign 
banks (Caruana J. Deppler M. 2006 p. 19). Purchase of Hypo Alpe Adria bank 
by a German bank decreased the exposure of BH to Austrian banks but it also 
decreased the exposure, which is anyway low, of Austrian banks to BH. German 
banks’ exposure in BH was only 0,3% of their total exposure in the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe.
The process of mergers and acquisitions that take place in European banking 
and in BH to some extent change the picture of the ownership of local banking. 
Recently Hypo Alpe Adria Group AG has been taken over by German Bayerische 
Landesbank. The bank Hypo Alpe Adria Group AG is one of the most profitable 
banks in the region of Central and Southeastern Europe and is considered to be 
one of the most profitable and attractive in Europe. It certainly disturbs their 
main competitors, i.e. Raiffeisen, Erste Group and Unicredit Group, and means 
the intensification of competition in the South-East of Europe. One of the possible 
consequences could be riskier bank operation in that area.
Mergers of two bigger banks from developed countries, in the case that those two 
banks have their subsidiary units in a third country, could lead to the undesired 
increase of concentration in that third country. This was the case in Poland after 
the merger of Unicredito and HVB banks, which resulted in the merger of the 
second and third largest banks in Poland, whose owners were these first two 
banks.
4. Conclusions
The  financial  sector  in  BH  has  several  positive  features.  Banks  had  been 
consolidated,  privatized  (mainly  by  foreign  owners)  and  a  high  degree  of 
concentration had been achieved. They rely on the foreign financial groups which 
they belong to to obtain funds and on the European financial market. They provide 226
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a sufficiently large supply of credit to companies and citizens. Macro-economic 
stability is achieved in the area of monetary policy (currency board), a low inflation 
rate and high public confidence in the local currency. Value added tax has been 
introduced and public spending is reduced to a realistic level, i.e. fiscal balance 
has been established. Good and so far effective regulation and supervision of the 
banking sector and other financial institutions has been established. As of now 
there are no serious problems as credit expansion is still underway. The problem 
is that the safety network is incomplete, as the Central Bank does not perform 
its function of the lender of last resort. The next problem is excessive exposure to 
foreign banks (Austrian and German) which, however, have very low exposure 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their appearance and behaviour in BH is a direct 
result of the international strategies of parent banks which bring some risks for 
BH economy. High competition in the domestic banking sector and the drive to 
make profits can cause carelessness in banks and the growth of risky investments, 
and possibly endanger the banks’ stability.
It has been noticed that big banks have a low CAR (capital in relation to risky 
assets). The BH economy is open and liberalized (financial and foreign trade area) 
which means that it is exposed to the unfavourable effects of irreversible flows of 
foreign capital. A high domestic credit expansion deteriorates the trade balance 
and current balance of payments. The inflow of foreign capital compensates for 
this and has a positive impact on the growth of foreign exchange reserves and 
the degree of international liquidity in the country. An unfavourable scenario 
can take place on the basis of a decrease of the inflow of capital from foreign 
countries or withdrawal of euro deposits from banks (conversion of the KM into 
euros) which could lead to the abandoning of the currency board (devaluation) 
and cause larger bank losses. SAFETY NETWORK SYSTEM IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
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